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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 10-2434 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
RAMON FERRER, 
AKA Poncho, 
 
Ramon Ferrer, 
                    Appellant 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania                                                          
District Court  No. 1-08-cr-00218-002 
District Judge: The Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 14, 2011 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed:  August 9, 2011) 
                              
_____________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________ 
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 Ramon Ferrer was convicted, along with two of his three co-defendants, of (i) 
attempt and conspiracy to distribute or to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 
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grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and (ii) 
interstate travel in facilitation of attempted drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
1952(a)(3).  The gist of the criminal conduct was a plot to transport 23 pounds of 
methamphetamine from Georgia to Pennsylvania for sale to one Antonio Pagan, who 
turned out to be a government informant.  Although the substance delivered to the 
informant initially field-tested positive for methamphetamine, later lab tests revealed that 
it in fact contained no narcotics.  Ferrer appeals his conviction and sentence.  The District 
Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; ours is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 
1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.   
 Ferrer raises five assignments of error, none of which has merit.  First, he says that 
the District Court should not have denied his motion in limine to restrict the scope of his 
cross-examination.  Ferrer says that he would have liked to testify at trial, but that he was 
dissuaded from doing so by the possibility that the prosecution would use the opportunity 
to cross-examine him about issues outside the subject matter about which he would have 
testified.  Unfortunately for Ferrer, his decision not to testify precludes us from reviewing 
the District Court’s ruling.  In Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984), the Supreme 
Court held that denial of a motion in limine under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) was not 
reviewable where the defendant did not testify.  The Court noted that a court cannot 
assess the balance of probative value against prejudicial effect without knowing the 
precise content of the testimony in question.  In addition, any harm resulting from denial 
of the motion is speculative: an in limine ruling may be altered; the government might 
decide not to use the evidence that was the subject of the motion after all; and the 
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defendant’s decision not to testify might actually have been motivated by something 
other than the motion’s denial.  Moreover, there is no way to assess whether an error is 
harmless if its effect on the defendant’s case is not known, and a rule allowing review 
where the defendant did not testify would allow him to ―plant‖ error in a trial by making 
dubious motions and then declining to testify.  See id. at 41–42.   Each of these rationales 
is equally applicable to a motion under Rule 611(b), and our sister circuits have extended 
Luce beyond the Rule 609(a) context.  See, e.g., United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 
1115–17 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Studnicka, 777 F.2d 652, 660 (11th Cir. 1985).   
Ferrer’s brief does not address this issue, and we see no reason why Luce should not 
control.  We therefore will not entertain his appeal of the District Court’s denial of his 
motion in limine. 
Ferrer next disputes the District Court’s finding that he was a manager or 
supervisor of a drug-smuggling organization, which qualified him for an enhancement 
under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b).  We review the District Court’s factual finding regarding the 
defendant’s role in the offense for clear error.  See United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 
378 (3d Cir. 2001).  The District Court rested its conclusion that Ferrer was a manager or 
supervisor on several grounds:  Ferrer solicited Pagan to be a customer of and distributor 
for the organization of which he was a part.  He rented facilities for the storage of drugs 
and put them to use.  He rented vehicles for the transportation of drugs and personally 
travelled between Georgia and Pennsylvania several times to supervise drug transactions.  
He directed one of his co-defendants to bring two pounds of methamphetamine to 
Pennsylvania.  And he helped to coordinate a meeting in Georgia that was a precursor to 
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the attempted drug deal that is the subject of this prosecution.  See App. 130–31.  Ferrer 
protests that there was ―significant evidence that [he] was not a manager or supervisor,‖ 
but was nothing more than a courier.  Ferrer Br. 20.  On clear-error review, however, it is 
not our role to weigh one side’s evidence against the other’s.  Reversal is appropriate 
―only if [the factual finding] is completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears 
no rational relationship to the supporting data.‖  Shire U.S., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 
F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 
F.2d 368, 370–71 (3d Cir. 1987)).  We cannot say that the court’s conclusion here lacks 
an evidentiary basis, and it must therefore be affirmed.  
Ferrer next argues that the District Court should not have counted the full 23 
pounds of counterfeit methamphetamine for sentencing purposes.   Ferrer was convicted 
of attempt and conspiracy.  The comments to the sentencing guidelines provide that the 
relevant amount for sentencing a criminal convicted of an inchoate offense is not the 
amount actually delivered (since no actual delivery is required for conviction), but rather 
the agreed-upon amount.  See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.12; United States v. Burke, 431 
F.3d 883, 887 (5th Cir. 2005).  The jury’s conviction entails findings that Ferrer intended 
to complete the full 23-pound deal, that he believed that the substance being delivered 
was in fact methamphetamine, and that he was part of a conspiracy (i.e., a criminal 
agreement) to complete the crime.  The District Court thus did not err in its application of 
the guidelines. 
 Ferrer’s fourth argument is that for sentencing purposes, the court should not have 
considered drugs and drug amounts that were involved in past, uncharged transactions.  
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Section 1B1.3(a)(2) of the sentencing guidelines permits counting past acts as ―relevant 
conduct‖ if they ―were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as 
the offense of conviction.‖  Each of the transactions in question was a sale of drugs from 
Ferrer to Pagan; they were all acts in furtherance of an illicit business relationship.  This 
is a sufficient ―common factor,‖ id. cmt. n.9(A), for all of them to be considered in 
determining Ferrer’s sentence. 
Finally, Ferrer claims to have been the victim of ―sentencing entrapment‖—the 
idea being that although he admits to a proclivity to commit a lesser offense, the 
government impermissibly enticed him into committing a greater crime.  Ferrer 
acknowledges a predisposition to agree to deliver as much as six pounds of 
methamphetamine to Pagan, but argues that he never would have agreed to provide the 
additional seventeen pounds if Pagan had not prevailed upon him.  We have not formally 
accepted sentencing entrapment as a valid theory, see United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 
229 (3d Cir. 2010), and this is not an appropriate case in which to do so.  The record 
shows that preliminary discussions involved as much as 70 pounds of narcotics, before 
the deal was scaled back to 23.  It was only after that agreement had been formalized that 
Ferrer told Pagan that he would only be able to provide five or six pounds.  Pagan then 
―cursed the shit out of him‖ and told Ferrer that he ―could find six pound[s] of meth on 
the side of the road,‖ App. 54, whereupon Ferrer agreed to uphold the initial 23-pound 
bargain.  The initial agreement to deliver 23 pounds of methamphetamine was a sufficient 
basis for the District Court’s determination that Ferrer was predisposed to participate in a 
drug sale of at least that scale, particularly in light of the evidence that he had previously 
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been involved in multiple other large narcotics transactions (ten kilograms of cocaine, 
100 pounds of marijuana).  Because Ferrer was so predisposed, he would be unable to 
successfully invoke sentencing entrapment even if it were a recognized doctrine. 
We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
